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Abstract
Computability and complexity are the two major lines along which the science of algorithms
has evolved; but the same concepts guide many human activities. We try to catch some glimpses
of the connections between these two worlds, to meet the expectations of the audience. We will
encounter nymphs and universal Turing Machines, ancient traditions and randomized procedures,
all tending to the same end: having fun with algorithms. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
Although the formalization of algorithms was essentially unknown before the present
century, a precise organization of actions has played an important role in the human
behavior much before landing in mathematics. Clearly a similar phenomenon has
occurred in all sciences. With the great profundity found in his entire work, Ernst
Mach insisted that scienti2c thought derives from common thought of people; and that
the development of scienti2c thought consists of a continuous and punctual correction
of common thought [5].
The integration between scienti2c and common thought is indeed strong in the 2eld
of algorithms, although scientists seem to have been too busy to notice this point (Mach
himself made only a few remarks about calculus, but at his times algorithmica was still
to be born). We will move in this direction without pursuing philosophic claims, with
the sole aim of enlightening the unplanned relevance of some mathematical concepts
in human (and, as we shall see, divine) behavior. Due to space constraints, we will
restrict our discussion to two speci2c topics: the role of self-reference in computing a
function and the growth of con2dence in algorithmic results for an increasing number
of independent testimonies.
1. Choe and the diagonal language
“Cretans lie”. This ancient statement stroke the bases of thought more than the
population of Crete (that, incidentally, was known for its sense of humor). Epimenides
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of Cnossus is credited as being the author of the provocation, as testi2ed even by
Apostole Paul (Titus I-12). A Cretan himself, Epimenedes thus introduced self-reference
into the statement: this would have not borne any consequence if not mixed with
negation (lie), as it instead was. In fact this disruptive combination gave rise to a
famous paradox: if the sentence were true (Cretans indeed lie) the author would have
laid, thereby implying that Cretans do not lie; and vice versa.
The same combination of self-reference and negation has been used along centuries
for many other paradoxical constructions, gradually moving from philosophic specula-
tions to mathematical logic. The most striking example of application in the latter area
is GDodel’s proof that any formal system containing the arithmetic of natural numbers is
incomplete [3]. With a clever construction of a mathematical environment, GDodel gave
a formula on natural numbers essentially equivalent to the statement: “This statement
cannot be proved”. The statement is provable in a chosen formal system if and only
if it is false in the same system. Therefore either we prove something untrue (that is
clearly contradictory) or the system is incomplete in the sense that contains statements
that are true but non-provable.
However, before proceeding into the theory of computing we shall again search
through the roots of our knowledge. Self-reference recalls the sorrowful existence of
Echo and Narcissus, in one of the most delicate stories of Greek mythology. Narcissus
was a beautiful youth, but inaccessible to love. Nemesis caused him to walk to a
clear fountain where he could see his own image reHected in the water; and Narcissus
became so enamoured of himself that he drowned trying to reach his image. Echo (a
nymph of questionable honor, as she used to divert the attention of Hera while Zeus
was having fun with the other nymphs) had a pure feeling of love for Narcissus. When
he died she pined away in grief, leaving to us, as sole remains, her voice changed into
an echo.
Narcissus loved himself in such a lyrical manner to induce us to speculate on the
nature of love: a subtle question thoroughly examined by Plato [7]. Following his
analysis we must preliminarily investigate the development of mankind, with crucial
attention to the geometric shape of their bodies. Originally each person was round
all over, with four arms and legs, two faces perfectly alike, two privy members, and
all the other parts in proportion. So there were three sexes: man–man (the male),
woman–woman (the female), and man–woman (the androgynous, sharing equally in
male and female). Their round shape gave them incredible vigor and speed, so they got
to conspire against the gods. In punishment Zeus ordered to split them in two halves.
Since then each human being seeks desperately the missing half. In Plato’s own words:
“thus anciently is mutual love ingrained in mankind, reassembling our early estate and
endeavouring to combine two in one and heal the human sore”. Now all this explains
the diKerent natures of love. The halves of the original male, or of the female, search
and love beings of their own sex. The halves of the androgynous, instead, search the
missing half in the opposite sex, until they 2nd it in happiness, or proceed for ever
in an adulterous life. Although the sympathy of Plato does not seem to be directed
to the third gender, much can be learned from heterosexual behavior. While arrogance
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Fig. 1. Part of the in2nite matrix of mythological loves.
has condemned mankind to the perpetual search of a lost nature, the androgynous was
happy in his completeness. Much earlier than Narcissus, the androgynous loved himself.
Let us now return to Echo. She loved Narcissus with sincerity, but her questionable
behavior in the Zeus business may induce a legitimate suspicion of additional, more
relaxed sentiments. So we extend the de2nition of the nymph to one who loves all the
ones who love themselves (Narcissus and the androgynous, among others). But does
Echo love herself? The question is logically harmless: since self-reference is not mixed
with negation, both answers, yes or no, are consistent with the de2nition of Echo. The
paradox arises with a nymph of opposite feelings: Choe (pronounce ′k Mo −′ e), who
loves the ones who do not love themselves. Now the question of whether Choe loves
herself or not is autocontradictory, as in Epimenides’ paradox.
To depict the whole situation we make use of the matrix of mythological loves
(Fig. 1) whose interest is enhanced by the numerous loving habits of those creatures
[1] and to which Cantor’s diagonal argument applies naturally. Deities were numerable
but virtually in2nite in number, as they were personages of past anecdotes and tales yet
to be told, materializations of natural events, protectors of homes and 2elds, inhabitants
of fountains, trees and mountains. Each one with in2nite variations according to place
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or time. Fig. 1 shows only a part of an in2nite table, where Y , or N , appears in
cell (i; j) to indicate that the creature in row i loves, or does not love, the creature in
column j. Here we 2nd reciprocal eternal loves, as the one of nymph Arethusa merging
with Alpheus, god of rivers, in the conHuence of two streams in Siracusa. Alpheus has
Y only for Arethusa, and Arethusa has Y only for Alpheus. Non-reciprocal violent
loves, as the one of Zeuss in the form of a bull who raped Europa. Y and N are
non-symmetrical in this case. The reHexive loves of Narcissus and Androgynous, with
a Y on the diagonal of the matrix. The love of Echo for them and only for them. Blank
cells of the matrix may denote lack of information on our side, as in the case of the
cell (Echo, Echo) where both Y and N would be legitimate. But blanks also denote
a subtler situation. Apollo, for example, may regularly go round with Europa without
yet having a precise feeling for her. Nobody knows if he will eventually decide for Y
or N , or go on for ever. A blank here denotes that a procedure is still running. And
now, what is the position of Choe into the matrix?
A diagonal argument shows that Choe cannot be a member of the celestial company,
because her row would not have a consistent entry at the intersection with the diagonal.
That is, although the behavior of Choe is well de2ned, she could exist only as a living
paradox (this is probably the reason why Choe is not found in any book of mythology).
If we insist to be living in a world free of paradoxes Choe does not exist, although
her behavior does. Indeed behaviors are functions D → {Y; N; }, where D = {
 | 

is a deity} is the in2nite set of deities, and denotes a blank; and deities are Turing
Machines. In the matrix, behaviors are represented as rows of in2nite length, each
assumed by the deity speci2ed in the row label. Unlike labels, all possible rows are
not numerable: it is then not surprising that there exist legitimate behaviors that cannot
be assumed by anybody.
Mathematicians have certainly realized that Choe is the (non-existing) Turing Ma-
chine that should recognize the diagonal language Ld (see [4])
Ld = {
 | 
 ∈ D; 
 does not love 
}:
From this we can rephrase a classical result in terms of mythology. Let
Lu = { |  and  ∈ D;  loves }
be the universal language. We have
Theorem 1. Lu is recursively enumerable and non-recursive.
Proof. Let a deity of deities  be able to understand if another deity  will eventually
fall in love with , for arbitrary  and . (We like to think that  is indeed Hera, mother
of all deities and always interested in love stories.)  can induce  and  to meet, and
watch the behavior of . If  gives clear signs of enamourement, or disgust,  decides
for Y or N . This is enough to prove that Lu is recursively enumerable. However, if 
lingers,  may not decide by simple observation if  is going to eventually develop
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a stable sentiment, or keeps  in suspense for ever. Nevertheless, we now prove by
contradiction that  has no other means for deciding.
Assume that  can decide in 2nite time if  falls or not in love with , or will
linger inde2nitely.  and  being arbitrary,  can also decide if  falls in love with .
Complementing the output (where N and perpetual lingering are both seen as negative
answers),  would recognize Ld thereby taking the role of Choe, hence proving her
existence.
Such subtle arguments, we believe, should rightfully induce the sensation of being
fooled in any person of good sense. The responsibility of such an unpleasant condition
is totally on the side of the mathematicians, whose arguments are nevertheless to be
accepted because they are always validated by distinguished persons.
2. Massud and primality testing
“Nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in
deum quidem cadere videatur ut sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit”. (Nothing
indeed is as contrary to reason and regularity as chance. In fact not even the gods, I
believe, know what will happen by chance and fortune) [2].
Cicero underlined the power of chance with these words. Twenty centuries later,
computer scientists started using that power to solve diPcult problems in a new original
manner.
The story of chance is not completely clear. Democritus is often credited as being the
initiator, although no ancient thinker was possibly more mechanistic than he was. Only
in the sixteenth century Cardano picked up the concept again, until a correspondence
between Pascal and Fermat on the game of dice, one century later, gave oPcial birth
to the study of probability, and raised the discussion on chance again. Philosophers,
biologists, physicists have been deeply interested since then in the habits of this crazy
personage who mixes up a well ordered universe. They even discussed ardently if
chance existed at all (Carl Gustav Jung had no doubt of its existence as a threat
to rational behavior). Mathematicians went on more slowly: for long time they were
unable to satisfactorily formalize the rules of the game, until, a few decades ago,
Kolmogorov laid down the bases of a sound probability theory.
Discussing this matter is not our purpose. We will illustrate, instead, how the power
of chance can be exploited to give satisfactory answers to important and diPcult ques-
tions. The mathematical aspects of randomization can be studied in [6]. We examine
a more concrete fact taken from an ancient chronicle of Central Asia (oral tradition).
Massud, a young shepherd of the steppe, is consumed by the desire of knowing if
Pardis, his betrothed, is beautiful as all their relatives swear. By modesty and tradition
Pardis always appears in public with a veiled face, and only women can see her in
privacy. Massud wishes to inquire delicately with some of them, but speculates on
who are the right women to ask. He fears the opinion of relatives to be exceedingly
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positive; the judgment of Fatima (the belly dancer who used to be his secret girl friend)
to be exaggeratedly negative; the opinions of persons of similar taste and habits to be
meaninglessly similar. In essence, Massud wishes to collect reliable opinions from
independent witnesses chosen at random.
To proceed with scienti2c method, Massud establishes some rules based on his
knowledge of human psychology. A woman’s opinion that Pardis is unpleasant to the
sight must unfortunately be taken for sure. An opinion that Pardis is beautiful, instead,
has to be trusted with a certain probability p. In the 2rst case Massud will terminate
his enquiry, trying to escape his commitment for marriage without major damages. In
front of a positive opinion, instead, he will continue the enquiry with other women,
until he is convinced that his betrothed is really beautiful. The algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 1. TEST FOR BEAUTY
choose a positive integer k to establish the level of con8dence on the answer
while less than k women have expressed an opinion do
choose a new woman W independently at random
if OPINION(W;Pardis)= ugly
then return NO (and run away)
else continue
return YES (and stay).
We have:
Theorem 2. If algorithm 1 returns NO; Pardis is certainly ugly; otherwise she is ugly
with probability (1− p)k .
For example if Massud has decided to interrogate k =100 women, and in his neigh-
borhood p= 12 , the probability of marrying a girl who is ugly even if she passed the
test for beauty is reduced to 12100 . Massud can wisely accept such a result, thinking
that there is a higher probability to lose his own sight at the moment of lifting Pardis’
veil after marriage, for the concurrent attack of two tiger-hornets of the steppe, one
for each eye.
Note how powerful the method is. The test runs in time linear with k, under the
hypothesis that each woman speaks for constant time. If Massud is still not satis2ed
of the level of con2dence on the result reached with a certain value of k, he can
slightly increase this value to obtain a much higher con2dence. The nature of well
designed randomized (Monte Carlo) algorithms with a binary answer is thus revealed.
In polynomial time and using independent random choices, we reach a certainly correct
solution on one of the answers; on the other answer the solution may be wrong, but
this happens with a pre2xed and arbitrarily small probability. The parameters are then
tuned to have this probability smaller than the one that the algorithm fails for any other
reason, for example for an hardware crash.
Computer scientists have certainly recognized in algorithm 1 the structure of a fa-
mous primality test that marked the birth of randomized algorithms in 1976. Many
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other professionals, however, could bene2t from the power of chance. In particular
judges, who often have chance on their side in courts without even noticing it. With
the exception of judge Bridoye who used to give sentences casting dice [8].
We are not so arrogant to teach the judges what to do. But since common people
know judicial proceedings from the movies, let us raise for them a scienti2c argument
on the value of proofs. Was Socrates really guilty? Apparently not. But maybe he was
and solid proofs against him existed but were never discovered. Or maybe the judges,
secretly fond of philosophy, concealed the proofs of guilt to pronounce an apparently
unjust sentence upon the philosopher, with the purpose of raising popular sympathy in
his favor. Instead of going on with arbitrary speculations we shall take a mathematical
approach.
Let us assume that, in a liberal body of laws, a proof in favor of the defendant
is suPcient to sentence him not guilty and a proof against him has to be taken with
caution. If n independent testimonies of guilt have been produced and p1; p2; : : : ; pn
are the probabilities of them to be true (the judge assigns these values), the probability
that the defendant is unjustly condemned is (1−p1)× (1−p2)× · · · × (1−pn). The
responsibility of the judge is now clear. Since no sentence is absolutely certain, enough
testimonies must be accumulated until the probability of error becomes inferior to the
one that a diKerent accident renders the sentence vain. For example a blackout that
interrupts the execution by electric chair. To condemn an innocent is a very sad fact.
But with the aid of mathematics judges can at least do better than Bridoye who, after
all, gave a right sentence in every other suit.
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